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Feminist legal theory has, famously, spotlighted the connection
between substance and method.' Epistemological assumptions, forms of
reasoning, even nuances of tone, feminists remind us, can help to entrench
or disrupt damaging gender rules or norms. Thus, feminist legal work has
often nested a substantive critique in a broad challenge to the norms of legal
scholarship, legal reasoning, or both. Joan Williams's new book,
Unbending Gender,2 exemplifies this approach. She has as much to say
about the way that change should be framed, debated, and produced as she
does about the particular changes that are required. And her offerings in
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1. Examples of works highlighting this connection abound. In law, see, for example, Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991): and Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990). In philosophy, see, for example,
SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM WOMEN'S LIVES
(1991); and SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989).
2. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
To Do ABOUT IT (2000).
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both areas provide useful challenges to lawmakers, feminist theorists, and
the public.
Williams's substantive innovation is a shift in focus, from the
eroticization of dominance to the unresolved dilemmas of work/family
conflict.3 For more than a decade, she argues, feminists have focused
almost exclusively on sexualized dominance as an engine of women's
inequality. One casualty of this necessary focus has been a neglect of
problems that fall outside this pattern, such as the persistent tension
between market work and family work.4 Williams returns feminists to this
problem, yet she does so in a way that contrasts with earlier feminist
efforts. The problem, in Williams's analysis, is not simply a lack of
institutional expedients, such as family leave or flextime. It is domesticity, a
complex system of norms and institutional arrangements that keeps men
tethered to an increasingly demanding workplace, women professionally
marginalized and economically dependent, and children often destitute
upon their parents' divorce.5 Williams's goal is to illuminate the norms and
practices of domesticity and to explain how they can be deconstructed.
Yet Williams also proposes to address this challenge in a
methodologically distinctive fashion.6 Resisting a tendency toward unitary
or totalizing theory,7 Williams forges an approach that she describes as
pragmatic.8 Its pragmatism inheres in two primary features. The first is its
eclecticism: Williams combines a heterogeneous range of expedients in
order to achieve her goal. Domesticity is a system in which institutions
reflect and perpetuate popular attitudes toward market and family work;
therefore, a full program for change must address both attitudes and
institutions. Williams does so by advocating legal changes that would
require employers and families to recognize and to accommodate the work
3. See id. at x.
4. For an example of a discussion in which Williams makes this point, see id. at 6-7.
5. See id. at 1-4.
6. In the context of this review, I use the word "methodological" in a broad and non-
technical way, to include: (1) elements of the manner in which the substantive argument is
presented, such as choice of target audience, tone, and forms of reasoning; and (2) elements of
meta-strategy, such as Williams's embrace of Deweyian pragmatism, see infra notes 10-Il and
accompanying text, which intersect with the substance of an argument.
7. The theory that Williams is most likely attempting to resist is the dominance theory of
Catharine MacKinnon. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 245. MacKinnon has been criticized
for offering a unitary account that fails to take account of women's differences. See, e.g., Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Martha
R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon. 5
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993). Yet Williams also resists a feminist tendency toward
,"utopian" approaches (which need not be totalizing), a tendency she associates with the work of
Martha Fineman. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 238-39 & 327 n.93 (citing MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230-33 (1995)). See generally FINEMAN, supra (taking the view that the
way we conceive family must change in order to recognize and facilitate caregiving).
8. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 244.
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done by parents in caring for children. She also seeks to change the way
that people conceptualize this problem, so as to encourage public support
for flexible institutions. The second feature of Williams's pragmatism is its
emphasis on short-term workability. Practicality is a paramount concern,
and there is a limit to her willingness to challenge formative norms and
assumptions of the existing system. Williams clearly distinguishes her
approach from those she describes as "utopian," which seek to achieve
transformation over the long run and to challenge bedrock assumptions
about gender, family, and institutional life.9 Williams takes a Deweyian
perspective, 0 albeit a revisionary one: She seeks to "tease out the 'precious
values embedded in our traditions.'"" She then deploys those values as the
basis of either an immanent critique 2 or a "drag" performance that uses
modified versions of certain norms in order to challenge others.'3
9. See, e.g., id at 238-39, 254-63.
10. When I use the term "Deweyian," I refer to those aspects of Dewey's pragmatist
philosophy that involve the valuation and use of elements within the existing "tradition" or
normative framework. See JOHN DEWEY, Philosophy and Democracy, in 2 CHARACTERS AND
EVENTS 841 (Joseph Ratner ed., 1929), quoted in WILUASis, supra note 2, at 244.
11. WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 244 (quoting JOHN DEWvEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN
PHILOSOPHY 26 (1948) (" precious values embedded in social traditions")).
12. An immanent critique uses the dominant norms of a culture, institution, or political order
to provide a critique of a practice within it that fails to live up to those norms. It challenges the
institution or polity to fulfill the promise embodied in its dominant norms in the particular case.
Williams frequently states, for example, that a policy or outcome does not adequately reflect or
achieve "our commitment to gender equality," leading the reader to infer that Williams seeks to
use that ostensibly shared commitment to produce changes in the flawed policies. Id. at 37; see
also id. (arguing that viewing mothers' marginalization in the workforce as "[disc rimination
involves a value judgment that the constraints society imposes are inconsistent with its
commitment to equality"); id. at 120 (arguing that the "he-who-earns-it-owns-it" rule involves a
"heroic leap, which reflects assumptions drawn from coverture that are inconsistent with current
commitments to gender equality").
13. As defined by Williams, "drag" refers to the practice of dressing up in the kinds of
clothing conventionally considered to be appropriate to the other sex, in order to question or
subvert traditional gender roles through the discordant juxtaposition of sex and gender or of the
viewer's expectations about gender and the drag performer's presentation of gender. See id. at 7-8,
198-204. According to the most prominent theorist of "drag," Judith Butler, the purpose of
"drag" extends beyond the subversion of traditional gender roles to the subversion of naturalized,
binary notions of gender and sex and to the ostensibly unitary relation between them:
The performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the
performer and the gender that is being performed. But we are actually in the presence
of three contingent dimensions of significant corporeality: anatomical sex, gender
identity, and gender performance. If the anatomy of the performer is already distinct
from the gender of the performer, and both of those are distinct from the gender of the
performance, then the performance suggests a dissonance not only between sex and
performance, but between sex and gender, and gender and performance. As much as
drag creates a unified picture of " woman" (what its critics often oppose). it also reveals
the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which are falsely naturalized as
a unity through the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence .... In the place of the
law of heterosexual coherence, we see sex and gender denaturalized by means of a
performance which avows their distinctness and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of
their fabricated unity.
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FFiINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 137-38
(1990).
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Williams's pragmatism, however, is not her only methodological
innovation. She has also written a book that is professedly popular in its
orientation. 14 Unbending Gender is not intended to bypass academic
audiences. There is much of theoretical interest here; some of it even draws
on the dense, demanding language of Continental social theory. But
Williams has looked beyond the law, and beyond institutional structure, to
the role played by "gender talk": the ways in which the problem of
domesticity is framed and debated by average people. And it is to these
people, as potential readers, that Williams directs a substantial portion of
her argument. This choice means not only that she elects to present her
ideas in a highly accessible style, sometimes forgoing the elaboration of
theoretical nuances for the sake of clarity. It also means that she directs her
attention to aspects of political engagement not frequently the subject of
academic writing, such as the tone of a debate or the use of humor. 5
In joining others who have redirected feminist attention toward
questions of work and family, 6 Williams makes an important contribution.
She takes this step with great gusto and an abundance of new ideas. While
one can dispute some of her proposed solutions, her thirst to get to the
bottom of work/family conflict and her resourcefulness in refraining
debates and generating proposals are palpable in each chapter. I am
ambivalent, however, about the pragmatic and popular elements of her
approach. While the practical, "can do" ethos of the book is invigorating, I
remain unconvinced by the Deweyian aspect of Williams's pragmatism: the
decision to deploy the norms of domesticity against themselves. Whether
"the master's tools," in the words of the late Audre Lorde, can disassemble
"the master's house" ' 17 is, to my mind, a context-specific question: It
depends on the nature of the problem, the flexibility of the tools, and the
durability of the house. In this respect, Williams's incisive articulation of
the problem undermines, to some degree, her ability to solve it. The more 1
14. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 244.
15. See, e.g., id. at 245 (humor), 271 (male bashing).
16. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 7; ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD. THE TIME BIND: WHIEN
WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997); LENORE J. WEITZMAN. Till
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). For other legal feminist works that reflect more
generally on the relations among the family, the state, and the market, see, for example. MARTIA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 267-311
(1990): and Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CtlI. LEGAL F.
169.
17. AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House. in SISTER
OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984) (emphasis omitted). In this essay, Lorde critiques mainstream
feminists (including those who organized the conference for which the essay was prepared) for
neglecting the contributions and experience of women of color. Thus, the " tools" to which Lorde
refers are not, as some invocations of her language suggest, ostensibly neutral methodological
assumptions, but rather the habits of solipsism and exclusion that characterize those in positions of
relative privilege, whether they be men or women. For Williams's reference to Lorde's argument.
see WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 200 & 322 n.55.
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learn from Williams about the interwoven norms of domesticity, the more I
am convinced that these norms need to be challenged profoundly by a
systematic program of change that is possible only over the long run. I fear
that Williams's proposals, insightful and practical though they may be, will
rearrange only the surface features of our work and family structure,
leaving intact the attitudes toward masculinity, femininity, capitalism, and
the state that are responsible for much of the debilitating problem of
domesticity. These norms may be too institutionally entrenched for
successful resolution by the "serious play" "S of "drag" and the strategy of
pluralizing options. This may be one problem for which the "pragmatist"
must at least join hands with the "utopian" to ensure a solution.
Williams's decision to focus on a popular audience prompts a more
mixed assessment. The section of Unbending Gender that most clearly
addresses a more popular audience-Williams's analysis of "gender
talk" -falls, in some respects, wide of the mark. It treats a series of
differences that are at best a distraction as a central cause of the current
impasse. The book's effort to mnobilize a popular audience (through the
coining of phrases or the prescription of styles of engagement) may also
accomplish little if Williams's Deweyian pragmatism keeps her as far from
the heart of this problem as I suspect. However, Williams seems more
likely to succeed in the effort to engage a popular audience, which is also
one of her central goals. Feminist analysis of the causes and remedies of
this problem, as Williams recognizes, extends far beyond the formal legal
regime. Sustained exchange between feminist legal theorists and others
with lived experience of a problem might point to solutions that theorists
alone would not have anticipated. Williams's bold move in the direction of
"genre-bending" should encourage feminist theorists to explore these
possibilities.
This review will have three parts. After sketching the outlines of
Williams's ambitious project, I will turn first to the legal expedients she
proposes for restructuring the workplace and reallocating family property in
the event of divorce. I will then consider the "discursive" or "talk" -related
portion of Williams's agenda. In the final Part, I will offer an assessment of
Williams's primary methodological innovation: her pragmatic, popular
approach to restructuring market and family work.
18. "Drag" is often undertaken in a spirit of playfulness or fun. notwithstanding its serious,
subversive purpose. The paradoxical character of this practice is thus captured by the apparently
oxymoronic phrase "serious play."
2000]
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I. BREAKING THE BONDS OF DOMESTICITY
Unbending Gender opens with a vivid portrait of the tensions between
family and market work. 9 Men are consumed by the demands of their
employers, salvaging only brief intervals to connect with their families.
Women, who remain the primary caregivers whatever their employment
status, move frantically from dissatisfied employers to needy children,
exhausting and disappointing themselves in the process. Mothers who
devote themselves exclusively to caregiving-and the children who remain
in their custody-are predictably impoverished upon divorce. The cause of
this predicament is a complex system of gender norms that Williams refers
to as "domesticity." 'o Describing domesticity is Williams's central project
in Chapter 1.
Domesticity, which is both an ideology and a practice, positions men as
"ideal workers" in the market and women as economically marginalized
caregivers in the home.2' It justifies this arrangement by reference to the
innate characteristics of the two sexes and to the incontrovertible needs of
corporations and of small children. The normative assumptions of
domesticity, Williams argues, are embodied in three central tenets:
Employers are entitled to "ideal workers" who are immunized from family
responsibilities; men are expected and entitled to perform as "ideal
workers"; and women should have "all the time and love in the world to
give" to their children.2" Yet these tenets do not exhaust the normative
structure of domesticity. It is held in place by at least two supporting
assumptions, which make it particularly difficult to glimpse the influence of
domesticity or to reach it by structural or attitudinal reforms.
The first of these supporting assumptions is "commodification
anxiety" : a tendency to characterize (women's) familial labors as an
expression of love and commitment and a corresponding reluctance to
regard family work as compensable labor. "Commodification anxiety"
leads legal actors, as well as family members, to underestimate caregivers'
contributions to their families' material well-being;2" it is an animating
19. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at ix-x, 1-9.
20. See id. at 1.
21. See id. at 1-2.
22. Id. at 30 (quoting DEBORAH FALLOWS, A MOTHER'S WORK 13 (1985)); see also infra
text accompanying notes 30-33.
23. This term is actually introduced in Chapter 4 in Williams's discussion of the legal
treatment of caregiving women upon divorce. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2. at 118. As I argue
infra Subsection II.A.2, I view "commodification anxiety" as a central attitudinal support of
domesticity; thus, I think it might profitably have been introduced earlier in Williams's
discussion.
24. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 117-20.
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factor in judges' tendency to shortchange caregiving women upon
divorce.
The second support for domesticity is the use of a rhetoric of choice to
describe and justify work/family decisions.' Motivated by liberal precepts
and by psychological mechanisms of denial, men and women tend to see
themselves as free agents, acting on their individual preferences in
addressing family and work responsibilities. What this assumption of
"choice" obscures is both the constrained character of the alternatives
available and the fact that all choices are rigorously conditioned by the
normative "force field"27 created by domesticity. Workers affected by this
"force field" make choices consistent with the basic premises, yet they
experience and defend those choices as an authentic expression of their
individual character. As with "commodification anxiety," this assumption
makes it more difficult to see domesticity at work in the structure of market
and family labor and to do something about it.
Williams succeeds in demonstrating that domesticity presents a
complex and profoundly entrenched problem. In fact, her diagnosis of that
problem is the most compelling section of the book. Chapter 1 moves from
strength to strength in identifying the central elements of domesticity.
Williams's ability to see this system at work in such an unprecedentedly
broad array of contexts is one of her distinctive strengths. As a scholar who
works in the areas of family law and property as well as in feminist
jurisprudence, Williams is well-situated to observe these effects, and she
makes the point powerfully, showing readers that this is not simply a
scuffle over maternity leaves or flextime schedules, but a complex,
multifaceted system that renders most women professionally marginalized
and economically dependent or destitute.
A second engrossing and rhetorically powerful stroke is Williams's
decision to deduce the key elements of domesticity from the central
narrative of Deborah Fallows's A Mother's Work.28 From the vividly told
story of a mother who journeyed from market employment to full-time
parenting in the home,29 Williams draws the central elements of her portrait:
25. See, e.g., id. at 135-36.
26. Williams frequently describes those who hold this view as residing in the "republic of
choice." See, e.g., id. at 134.
27. Williams's initial discussion of the operation of gender (including domesticity) as a
"force field" occurs in iU. at 37-39.
28. FALLOWS, supra note 22.
29. Fallows's narrative is introduced in WILUAAMS, supra note 2. at 16-19. Although I have
not read Fallows's book beyond the excerpts reproduced and discussed by Williams, it seems an
ideal choice for this kind of treatment. Fallows is highly intelligent and sharply observant of her
situation, so the assumptions or arrangements she appears to take for granted form a useful index
of the kinds of premises that have become ingrained in many of us through the operation of
domesticity. In addition, the tenor of the excerpts, which ranges from harsh criticism of "full
commodification" to a self-celebratory view of her own choice to leave market work (see, for
example, the title of the book), attests to the tensions produced within women by this issue. In
20001
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the assumption that employers are entitled to "ideal workers" free from
family responsibilities3" and that men are entitled to perform in this way
regardless of their familial commitments;3 the assumption that women,
whatever their market labor commitments, should have "all the time and
love in the world to give" ;32 and the belief that women who select among
the slender and socially policed range of options available for
accommodating market and family responsibilities are exercising authentic,
autonomous choice.33 To make matters more interesting, Williams situates
her reading of Fallows within a larger historical discussion of the
movement "from status to affect." 3' Williams describes in evocative detail
how explanations emphasizing women's inferiority gave way to those
emphasizing their characteristic domestic proclivities in accounting for the
distinctive roles of women.35 The combination of a historical frame and a
contemporary analysis drawn from an accessible, popular text creates a
sophisticated and engaging account that seems likely to draw in all of
Williams's potential audiences.
The more difficult problem, however, is to think about how this
multifaceted problem might be addressed. What is required, Williams
argues, is not simply a maternal effort to replicate "ideal-worker" patterns
and a reliance on the market to pick up the all-too-plentiful slack. This
"full-commodification" 36 strategy, Williams reports in Chapter 2, has led to
employers feeling dissatisfied and working parents feeling inadequate and
time-starved.37 Contemporary families need an approach that challenges the
three central tenets of domesticity and also contends with its supporting
assumptions. Williams's wide-ranging, multifaceted solution, which she
particular, the excerpts' tone suggests the painful pressures experienced by many mothers who
decide not to pursue market work to justify their choices under a "full-commodification" regime.
30. See id. at 20-24.
31. See id. at 25-30.
32. Id. at 30 (quoting FALLOWS, supra note 22, at 13).
33. See id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 16.
35. In this discussion. Williams draws primarily on the work of legal historian Reva Siegel.
See id. at 16-19 & 280 nn.8, 16. & 18 (citing Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994);
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. L.J. 2127 (1994): Reva B. Siegel. "The Rule of Love": Wile
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996)).
36. See, e.g., id. at 40 (attributing the term to economist Barbara Bergmann).
37. First, the strategy tended to overestimate the extent to which child-related responsibilities
could be delegated to the market. See id. at 44-48. Second, the optimistic tone of the strategy,
essential perhaps to igniting change, obscured the fact that working primary care providers, even
supported by market-based childcare, could not perform like "ideal workers" or full-time parents.
As a result of this failure to acknowledge the partial character of the change, employers have been
perturbed by absenteeism, the inability to work overtime, and other inflexibilities produced by tie
inevitable intrusion of family responsibilities. And parents, usually mothers, who sense that they
are shortchanging their children and disappointing their employers, feel perpetually frantic and
inadequate. See id. at 44-54.
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characterizes as "reconstructive feminism," 3 embodies two basic kinds of
initiatives. The first initiatives are legal proposals, which restructure the
workplace to accommodate employees with important parenting
responsibilities and redefine family income as the joint property of wage-
earners and caregivers, both during marriage and, particularly, upon
divorce. The second initiatives are "discursive" or " talk" -related
proposals, which reframe longstanding debates and provide feminists with
conceptual and relational guidance as to how to proceed. These two
categories of proposals are presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and Chapters 5
through 7, respectively. Both sets of proposals embody Williams's strategy
of "domesticity in drag" -deploying dominant norms in a way that seeks
to challenge or change them-and her belief that the path to change lies in
pluralizing employers' and parents' options for managing market and
family work, rather than directly challenging those choices that currently
exist.
II. DECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTIVE FEMINISM
A. The Legal Agenda: Too Much, and Not Enough
Williams's legal agenda is a large and innovative piece of work. A
skilled autodidact, she has learned a great deal from historical, sociological,
and empirical perspectives about the contexts she proposes to regulate. In
addition to the vast base of knowledge that grounds her approach,
Williams's proposals are creatively and fully elaborated. She does not
simply gesture in the direction of a new legal claim: She offers a series of
antidiscrimination actions aimed at protecting and demarginalizing part-
time and flextime work, and she proposes a regime of joint property that
would protect primary caregivers and their children upon divorce. Williams
elaborates each of these claims in painstaking detail, demonstrating a care
and conscientiousness about the nuts and bolts of her proposals that many
legal scholars lack. Finally, the substantive vision enacted by Williams's
proposals is itself positive: I have no doubt that, were we to wave a wand
and enact Williams's legal changes, we would be considerably better off
than we are today.
Yet my concerns about the efficacy of these proposals may be found in
both parts of this qualified praise. First, we cannot wave a wand in order to
implement these changes; we must rely on a judicial embrace of the claims
or rules proposed. It is not clear to me that most courts would be willing to
38. See, e.g., id- at 4. "Reconstructive feminism." as Williams uses the term, also
encompasses her methodological innovations and such tactical solutions as the use of humor in
feminist persuasion. In fact, the term "reconstructive feminism" might be viewed as co-extensive
with Williams's approach in Unbending Gender as a whole.
2000]
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accede to the assumptions they reflect. This difficulty is not a failing in a
more "utopian" theory, which operates on the basis of an extended time
horizon. But in a theory whose road-readiness is presented as an important
virtue, judicial resistance or incomprehension is a more serious drawback.
Second, even if we assume that courts will embrace these legal
innovations, the proper question is not whether these changes will make us
better off than we are today. The current structure of market and family
work is prejudicial to virtually all parents (albeit in different ways), and
many kinds of changes would have at least slight ameliorative effects. The
question, rather, is whether the changes proposed are sufficient to make
important inroads on the tenacious, tentacular system of domesticity that
Williams exposes. Here it is not easy to share Williams's optimism. While
these proposals reflect important departures from the current abysmal
arrangements, they quite explicitly leave intact many normative premises
on which domesticity thrives: the single-minded, unencumbered worker as
at least one vision of the ideal employee, and the "commodification
anxiety" that renders courts and policymakers reluctant to assign market
value to the work performed in the home. The persistence of such norms,
even in the face of limited legal change, may press the system in the
direction of domesticity, isolating and limiting any legal changes that can
be achieved. I will explore the likely reactions of legal decisionmakers and
the consequences of leaving dominant norms intact in the context of
proposals targeting the workplace and those directed at the family. As to
both, I will suggest that, while Williams's proposals may go too far to win
the prompt assent of legal decisionmakers, they are unlikely to go far
enough to destabilize domesticity.
1. Litigating Change in the Workplace
Antidiscrimination law is Williams's legal framework for restructuring
the workplace. In Chapter 3, she builds on an analysis introduced by
feminists such as Vicki Schultz3 9 to argue that employers who construct
workplaces around male bodies and male norms deny equal employment
opportunities to women. To expect an employee to work overtime, to travel
on short notice, or to undertake other tasks that require insulation from
family needs is to presuppose an employee who is male or who is, at least,
inhabiting a masculine gender role. "Given that nearly ninety percent of
women become mothers during their working lives," 40 that most of them
39. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998)
(describing sexual harassment as a means of establishing masculinity as a norm or requirement for
the most desirable jobs).
40. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 2.
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work part-time or exclusively within the home," and that virtually all
eschew overtime,42 to require the attributes of the "ideal worker" for
promotion, benefits, or "plum" assignments is to deny the vast majority of
women basic employment opportunities. To provide grounding for a
prospective legal claim, Williams surveys a range of policies that individual
employers have undertaken to accommodate familial responsibilities; she
also reviews a sizeable empirical literature that demonstrates that these
expedients reduce absenteeism and employee turnover and increase
productivity and employee loyalty. 3 She then proposes claims under Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act that would establish that a failure to provide
these options or to promote those who choose them is employment
discrimination.'
Of Williams's proposed legal reforms, using employment
discrimination law to prevent the marginalization of workers who are also
caregivers seems to me the most promising. The insight that contemporary
workplaces marginalize women not by straightforward exclusion, but rather
by instantiating and defending a range of masculine norms represents an
important development within feminist antidiscrimination scholarship. By
analogizing the marginalization of workers who are primary caregivers to
the sexual harassment of working women or to the design of equipment to
male body specifications, Williams takes this insight in a fascinating
direction.
But while I have no difficulty believing that basing an "ideal-worker"
prototype on characteristically male patterns of employment and
characteristically male access to a flow of household services discriminates
against women, asking courts to believe it is a different challenge
altogether. Male characteristics may define work, but what makes the
patriarchal legal system "metaphysically ... perfect,"4 5 as Catharine
MacKinnon has memorably observed, is that this socially established
identity between the good and the male is kept carefully hidden from view.
Where feminists see gendered work requirements, many employers see the
job as it has always been done. I suspect that courts may share this more
prevalent view, as well as its (inaccurate) corollary: that the job as it has
been done is the job the only way it can be done. If courts view the current
structure of market labor as arising from the nature of the work itself rather
than from the masculine identities of most of those performing it, it may be
difficult for them to accept Williams's claims.
41. Williams puts the figure for married mothers at -'nearly two-thirds." Id.
42. Wiliams notes "that jobs requiring extensive overtime exclude virtually all mothers (93
percent)." Id
43. This discussion occupies a substantial part of Chapter 3. See id at 84-100.
44. See id. at 101-10.
45. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEtNIST THEORY OF THE STATE 116 (1989).
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Consider how this problem might emerge in one particular context: the
disparate-impact claim under Title VII for the design of a promotion track
that excludes most mothers or primary caregivers of young children. 6
Three showings, Williams explains, constitute the plaintiff's prima facie
case: She must demonstrate, first, that the promotion process produces a
disparate impact on women; second, that the paucity of women in upper-
level jobs is a product of the employer's action rather than women's
choices; and, third, that the employer has specific policies relating to
promotion that produce the disparities cited. The defendant must then
demonstrate that the promotion policies constitute a business necessity; if
this showing is made, the plaintiff must demonstrate the availability of a
"less discriminatory alternative." 
47
One could imagine ingrained judicial assumptions about the nature of
the "ideal worker" affecting adjudication under this approach in at least
two ways. First, courts have proven remarkably reluctant to acknowledge
the ways in which employer policies or attitudes shape women's choices."
Williams is either less impressed by this pattern than I am or more
optimistic about the prospects for change. She notes that while women may
have a great deal invested in considering their choices as authentic and
unencumbered, courts have no such investment.49 Yet the Sears case,"0
which Williams mentions in an earlier discussion of "choice"'" but does
not revisit in this chapter, is a sobering recent indication that the courts may
be no more eager to deconstruct "choice" than are individual women." The
46. It is also easy to imagine a second context in which prevalent judicial attitudes might
create a stumbling block: Williams's claim of discrimination against part-time workers under the
Equal Pay Act. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 107-08. If one considers the way that part-time
workers are currently viewed in the legal profession, which is the professional context from which
judges emerge, it is easy to imagine that judges might have difficulty concluding that the work
done by part-time employees, particularly in white-collar settings, is "substantially equal" to the
work done by full-time employees. Williams acknowledges this as a possible problem but does
not confront its potential to undermine her proposed claim. See id. at 102-03.
47. See id. at 105-07.
48. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: Anz
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation.
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1081-82 (1992) (finding that, during the period 1965-1989, courts were
more likely to credit the lack-of-interest defense in gender than in race cases in large part because
of a "presumption that sex segregation is the expression of women's own culturally (or even
biologically) inspired 'differences' in job preferences").
49. She observes that "[tiheir mandate is to consider whether the constraints women face
constitute discrimination. If they do, the fact that many women may have internalized those
constraints does not provide employers with an excuse for continuing the discrimination."
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 106.
50. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. III. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988).
51. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 14.
52. This treatment is somewhat puzzling, inasmuch as Williams wrote one of the leading
articles about Sears and the double-edged triumph of difference feminist theories. See Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 797 (1989). One of her central arguments in
this article was that the judicial embrace of difference feminism, or cultural feminism, created an
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reasons for this investment are not personal, but rather professional and
ideological. Acknowledging socially imposed constraints on "choice"
means at least placing a social constructivist gloss on, and perhaps revising
altogether, a central liberal premise of the legal system. I agree with
Williams that revising this premise is a crucial goal, but I see it as a major
undertaking, not a pragmatic solution one might expect to see readily
achieved.
Second, courts may also encounter difficulty resisting employers'
claims of "business necessity." Williams seeks to protect potential
plaintiffs against the claim that a workforce of unencumbered employees is
essential to business success. The chapter contains an impressive review of
the empirical literature suggesting that "family-friendly" policies reduce
absenteeism and turnover and increase employee loyalty and, sometimes,
productivityf53 I suspect, however, that most judges could be exposed to
such evidence without abandoning their belief that businesses require
employees who can work overtime, travel at will, and live free from the
need to reconcile personal and professional demands. Employers, as
Williams observes, have known about such studies for years but have not
initiated widespread efforts to redesign their promotion tracks.Y If
employers, for whom questions like absenteeism and turnover would be
likely to loom large, are able to compartmentalize such evidence, we might
expect to see the same pattern among judges. In the absence of a sustained
political assault on dominant conceptions of work and productivity, judges
may view such studies as limited investigations of how particular policies
affect certain indicia in specific workplaces, not as data that should
challenge their intuitive sense of the optimal structure for producing
competitive legal work or safe electrical wiring. Were judges to hold the
latter view, it would affect their findings regarding both "business
necessity" and the question whether a plaintiff's proposed approach was
actually a viable alternative, less discriminatory or not.
But my main concern does not revolve around whether or not judges
are currently prepared to embrace the necessary assumptions. As I will
make clear below, I strongly support a sustained campaign to produce
major normative change, although the need for such an effort might be seen
expectation that women would make different kinds of choices about market labor than would
men, rendering it difficult for courts to see that some of these choices could be understood as the
products of social constraint. See id. at 819-21. For another useful analysis of judicial reluctance
to apply a more critical lens to women's employment choices, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work: Judicial interpretations of Ser Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990).
53. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2. at 84-94 (discussing "family-friendly" policies including
childbirth leave, part-time work, telecommuting, job sharing, flextime. compressed workweeks.
and employer support for childcare and elder care).
54. See id. at 84-86, 113.
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as a drawback in a "pragmatist" program like Williams's. But whether
such assumptions are adopted over the short term or in the longer run, they
need to effect a major transformation of our currently unacceptable system
of market and family labor. Here is where I have my most serious doubts
about Williams's proposal. Most of Williams's antidiscrimination
expedients, from the Title VII disparate-impact claim,5" to the Equal Pay
Act claim5 6 to the enactment of a strengthened Contingent Workforce
Equity Act,5 7 are designed to bolster part-time and other family-friendly
work patterns. The goal of these initiatives is to prevent employers from
making such work patterns marginal, by requiring employers to assign
comparable (or pro rata) pay, benefits, and opportunities for advancement
to those who elect them. This strategy is meritorious, even ingenious. Yet I
question whether it will actually alter the dominant norms of most
workplaces or the kinds of roles that men and women play within them.
First, because of Williams's reluctance to challenge fully the sources of
privilege within the status quo, I suspect that this strategy underestimates
the informal resistance that may emerge. 8 One piece of Title VII history
that may be germane is the stigmatization to which many people of color
have been subjected in workplaces that have been required by law to hire,
retain, and promote them.59 When the law protects non-dominant persons or
patterns without exploring and challenging sources of privilege for
dominant groups or patterns (in this case, the assumptions that make the
largely male class of full-time, familially supported workers "ideal"), the
55. See id. at 104-10.
56. See id. at 101-04.
57. See id. at 108.
58. The emergence of sexual harassment in recently integrated (and traditionally male)
employment categories is but one example of the ability of opposition to women in the workplace
to "morph" into new and elusive forms. See BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND TIE WORKPLACE
133-34 (1985). It is also possible to observe this phenomenon in the prevalence of job categories
such as road crews, police forces, and air traffic controllers in sexual harassment cases. Advocates
or legislators can, of course, adapt the law to try to capture these new expressions of resistance,
but such a strategy makes for a slow and incremental movement forward.
59. This theme can be found in two distinct and even opposed bodies of literature: the critical
race literature on continuing stigmatization, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (describing the
operation of various forms of stigmatization in the employment process); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317 (1987) (describing the operation of unconscious racism in academic and employment
settings), and a body of work critical of Title VII-inspired measures such as affirmative action that
have ostensibly contributed to the stigmatization of people of color in educational and
professional settings, see, e.g., Jeff Howard & Ray Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority: The Hidden
Obstacles to Black Success, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1985, at 17, 17 (contending that the
intellectual performance of blacks is being stymied by a tendency to avoid intellectual
competition, which in turn reflects the internalization of stigmatizing views of black intellectual
potential); Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism: How Preferential Treatment Works Against
Blacks, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18, 18 (arguing that affirmative action facilitates the
hiring and promotion of workers who are underqualified for their jobs, fueling a stigmatization of
minorities that undermines the original goals of affirmative action).
[Vol. 109: 745
Cross-Dressing in the Master's Clothes
results are likely to be incomplete. The gap between formal requirement
and informal perception may give rise to new ways of penalizing alternative
work patterns or privileging "ideal workers." 0
Williams does not forgo all opportunities to question the sources of
privileging "ideal workers." She points to the economic goals of
productivity and efficiency as supporting the ideal of a worker who does
not attempt to reconcile his workplace obligations with other commitments.
Her extensive review of the literature on part-time schedules provides the
internal critique that privileging this kind of worker does not always
conduce to efficiency or productivity within the firm. However, Williams
declines to take the next step: to challenge the notion that norms of
efficiency and productivity should figure centrally in assigning privilege to
work patterns. Alternative norms, such as the norm of parental care, are
pressed as a justification for ending the exclusive privilege of the "ideal
worker" and for demarginalizing workers seeking to integrate work and
family obligations. But neither the basic privilege of the "ideal worker" nor
the economic norms that are used to justify it are ever subjected to
sustained criticism. Williams does not propose that the government require
a thirty-hour work week6' or reward firms for encouraging employees to
take parental leave.62 The principles, and beneficiaries, of a capitalist
economic regime are permitted to move ahead at full throttle; Williams
simply seeks to allow others to jump aboard this moving train.
Second, protecting women who favor alternative schedules is only half
the battle. While such protection is crucial to prevent women from being
professionally marginalized by childrearing or rendered destitute by
divorce, family work will be more equitably shared (and less professionally
costly for women) only if men can be persuaded to play a substantial role
and to avail themselves of family-friendly policies. Here, the distance
between formal requirement and informal perception can be critical. The
60. In the context of race and employment opportunity, the increasingly successful attack on
race-conscious employment policies, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(finding federal contractor set-aside programs to be unconstitutional) City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding a municipal affirmative action program to be
unconstitutional); Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thermstrom. Reflection$ on The Shape of the
River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999) (book review) (critiquing affirmative action at the
university level as an unjustified and ineffective means of responding to racial inequality in
education), may be viewed as one product of the gap between formal requirement and informal
perception.
61. This proposal has been actively, if unsuccessfully, advanced in Sweden. not only by
feminists within the Social Democratic Party, but more recently by two smaller parties. See Linda
Haas, Nurturing Fathers and Working Mothers: Changing Gender Roles in Sweden, in MM,
WORK, AND FAMILY 238, 254 (Jane Hood ed., 1993).
62. See Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap 7 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with The Yale Law Journal) (arguing for amendments to the Family and Medical Leave
Act that either require or offer strong incentives to encourage the taking of parental leave by all
male employees).
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expectation that men will perform as family-free "ideal workers" arises
both from employers' (structurally entrenched) assumptions and from more
pervasive gender norms that link masculinity with the ability to function as
the family provider. I noted above Williams's reluctance to challenge
employers' assumptions; but she also declines to interrogate the
assumptions that have linked masculinity with provider status. Williams
suggests that these norms have been gradually changing, creating an
opening for a regime that allows men, as well as women, greater choice to
complete the process.63 However, a growing body of scholarship suggests a
far more complicated relationship between masculinity and the provider
status associated with primary commitment to market work.
While men have slowly and incrementally expanded their role in
childcare over the past two or three decades,64 it has been far more difficult
to loosen their attachment to "primary provider" status within the family, a
role that usually calls for "ideal-worker" performance. Sociologist Michael
Kimmel, for example, observes that some men's widely cited willingness to
give up their jobs to spend more time with their children is "more often
rhetorical than real; few men would actually switch places with their non-
working wives if given the opportunity."'65 This is partly because, within
many corporate cultures, "investing more energy into the home is a form of
treason" 66-a view that throws the normative weight of American
capitalism into the effort to preserve the link between masculinity and
provider status. But even where governmental and corporate cultures have
become increasingly accommodating, men may struggle with conceptions
of masculinity that have been instilled in a broad range of social settings.
Evidence of this tendency is found in studies of paternal leaves in Norway
and Sweden, countries that have striven to facilitate men's access to and use
of paternity leaves by means of a broad range of governmental
regulations.67 In these contexts, men take less frequent and shorter leaves68
and engage in different kinds and styles of parenting activities.69 More
interestingly, some of these fathers attempt to distinguish their parenting
63. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 99 (citing data describing how many men would be
willing or eager to stay home with their children).
64. See Joseph Pleck, Are "Family-Supportive" Employer Policies Relevant to Men?. in
MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY, supra note 61, at 217, 219-29 (noting that men have gradually
increased their caregiving roles in the family and the extent to which they use such policies as
flextime or parental leave, but that they use such policies differently than women do, often taking
"informal" leaves or other less conspicuous forms of departure from "ideal worker"
performance, so as not to raise questions about their commitment to the workplace).
65. Michael S. Kimmel, What Do Men Want?, HARV. BUS. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 50. 55.
66. Id.; see also Pleck, supra note 64, at 231-32 (observing that male employees are reluctant
to use formal parental leave because employers and co-workers view it negatively).
67. See, e.g., Beit Brandth & Elin Kvande, Masculinity and Childcare: The Reconstruction
of Fathering, 46 Soc. Rav. 293, 293 (1998); Haas, supra note 61, at 239-43.
68. See Brandth & Kvande, supra note 67, at 298-99; Haas, supra note 61, at 249.
69. See Brandth & Kvande, supra note 67, at 301-05; Haas, supra note 61, at 248.
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activities explicitly from those of mothers by criticizing the mothers' style
of parenting or by designating certain activities, most notably housework,
as outside the bounds of the paternal caregiving job." While scholars
attribute some of these differences, such as those involving frequency or
length of paternal leave, to structural features of market work,7 they see
others, such as the explicit abstention from housework, as reflecting an
attitudinal struggle over whether serious caregiving activity can be
reconciled with dominant understandings of masculinity.' Unless the
norms that support a link between masculinity and provider status are
identified, analyzed, and gradually revised-something that Williams
seems reluctant to do73-her family-friendly alternatives will remain
hothouse flowers, artificially protected by a set of legal supports, but
normatively inconsistent with their environment and viewed with suspicion
or ambivalence by many employees. The price of Williams's reluctance to
challenge bedrock norms of our economic and gender systems may be a
limit on her ability to transform the structure of market work.
2. Litigating a Change in Family Entitlements upon Divorce
Williams's second legal proposal, presented in Chapter 4, addresses the
economic well-being of caregivers and their children upon divorce. Family
law in most states, Williams argues, reflects a "he-who-earns-it-owns-it"
rule74 that views family income and other property as the exclusive property
of the wage-earning partner, most often the man. This rule is the product of
gender norms that position the man as the wage-earner and economic
70. See Brandth & Kvande, supra note 67. at 301-07.
71. See Haas, supra note 61, at 251-57 (citing the wage gap and sex segregation of the labor
force as factors that may make it more costly for a father to be out of the work force).
72. See Brandth & Kvande, supra note 67. at 307-10 (concluding that primary parenting by
men can be reconciled with "hegemonic masculinity" only where it is differentiated from
mothering and where it is undertaken by the most privileged and professionally successful men).
73. Williams's treatment of this question is ambivalent: In earlier sections of the book she
offers a more nuanced portrait, highlighting economic, structural, and normative factors that tether
men to the "ideal-worker" pattern, while also underscoring a yearning many experience for a
larger familial role, see, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2. at 3-4: yet in Chapter 3. she stresses the
economic and structural barriers to alternative patterns (now removed) and the yearning (now
sufficient to motivate the change) without reemphasizing the constraining force of traditional
conceptions of masculinity, see, e.g., id. at 99-100.
74. See id. at 120-22. This interpretation of current family law doctrine is not. however.
shared by all family law scholars. See. e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DtSSOLrTON:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (Proposed Final Draft Part 1. 1997) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW] (describing "equitable distribution" as having become the dominant
rule, replacing the previous division between common-law states, which viewed property as
belonging to the wage-earner, and community-property states, which viewed it as the joint
property of the two marital partners), MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN. THE ILLUsION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORt 17-36 (1991) (describing
feminist-supported reforms in divorce law that reconstructed marriage as an equal partnership and
allocated property accordingly).
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provider; it is also the product of "commodification anxiety." Because
market work is labor, and family work is love, only those who work in the
market are entitled to the economic fruits of their labor. Upon divorce, what
has been earned remains the property of the (male) spouse who performs
the market labor; the domestic contribution of the non-" ideal-worker"
spouse, viewed as a sacrifice undertaken out of familial love and obligation,
produces little or no entitlement to property. Post-divorce awards to
primary care providers and their children are thus based upon a notion of
what such dependents "need" for sustenance, not upon what they have
become entitled to as a consequence of their labor. This approach, when
coupled with the "clean break" rule75 that restricts alimony or child support
to a level consistent with the ability of the non-custodial parent (again,
usually the man) to begin a new family, has meant that divorce spells
downward mobility and often poverty for many caregivers and their
children.
The present legal approach fails to recognize, Williams argues, that a
market wage is in fact earned by two members of a two-parent family: the
one who focuses on market work and the one who (whether she performs
her own market work or not) provides the stream of family services that
permits him to function as an "ideal worker." 76 An appropriate family-law
rule would recognize this type of couple as having joint property in the past
earnings of the primary economic provider.77 With respect to the more
pivotal post-divorce income, this equal division may be inadequate because
one household usually contains both a parent and the children of the
marriage, while the other contains only a parent, at least initially living
alone. So Williams proposes an allocation of income that equalizes the
standard of living of the two post-divorce households. This arrangement
should continue throughout the children's dependence, a period which
should be recognized as concluding with the end of their formal (usually
75. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 126. This rule is also sometimes referred to as the "fresh
start" rule. See id. This view of current divorce law, too, is contested by some family law
scholars. One study has concluded:
[The "clean break"] vision of alimony does not describe the law that one finds today in
most appellate opinions. At least in long term marriages one ... finds a widespread
view that marital dissolution should not dissolve all financial ties between the former
spouses if the result would be a significant disparity in the spouses' post-dissolution
financial standing. A similar intuition encourages awards in marriages of shorter
duration as well, where there are children of the marriage who are still young and will
be primarily in the care of one spouse.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, supra note 74, at 5.
76. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 124-25. Without ongoing nurturance of the children, care
of the house, and even such specialized services as the keeping of household accounts or the
entertainment of co-workers and clients, it would be impossible for the "ideal worker" to commit
himself to the workplace in the single-minded (and consequently highly valued) way that he does.
77. See id. at 125-27.
78. See id. at 129.
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college) education. But it should also be extended for an additional period,
facilitating the caregiving woman's transition to market labor."'
The joint-property approach, while provocative and well-elaborated,
reflects some of the same drawbacks as its market counterpart. It is likely to
be viewed with skepticism by courts and legislatures, particularly in the
short run. Yet, because of Williams's resolve to accommodate
"commodification anxiety," her approach is unlikely to produce systematic
changes in divorce law, even if courts were to adopt it. Williams
acknowledges the first problem toward the end of the chapter, where she
treats a series of probable objections to the joint-property approach based
on cases in which wives have unsuccessfully claimed a joint interest in the
products of their husbands' graduate degrees.' Williams discounts the
degree cases as atypical because they impinge on the judges' personal
interests in believing that their degrees are the products of their own labor.
Judges also resist these cases, Williams notes, because of their larger belief
that "the husband's career success and the wife's marginalization both
result not from a system that privileges men because they can command a
flow of domestic services from women, but from the idiosyncrasies of two
individuals residing in the republic of choice."'" Williams observes, finally,
that the women's use of human-capital theory in these cases may have
triggered the courts' "commodification anxieties," a problem that would
not occur under her joint-property approach.' While I applaud Williams's
effort (here and elsewhere) to respond to possible objections, I think her
answers understate the potential barriers to the joint-property approach.
While the degree cases may implicate the interests of judges, as
advanced degree holders, in a particularly immediate way, this is only a
specific manifestation of a more generalized tendency to see autonomous
choice where one could see instead a system of unequal constraints. This
tendency operates among men, who want to credit their hard work and who
do not want to feel implicated in the marginalization of their wives. It also
operates among women, who do not want to feel that their labor has been
unfairly exploited. Because the image of "individuals residing in the
republic of choice"83 receives such widespread structural and normative
support, it is easier to persist in this belief than to challenge it. This is
especially true for judges, whose legal socialization gives them a
professional investment in the liberal conception of "choice." Thus, in the
short run, when courts have not had time to benefit from a full-fledged
79. See i. at 129-30.
80. See id. at 131-38 (citing, inter alia, Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1986); Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)).
81. I. at 134.
82. See id. at 136.
83. 1& at 134.
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political challenge to these norms, they are likely to view the joint-property
proposals as another effort to get women what they "need," rather than as a
valid justification for a new system of entitlements. This misunderstanding
of Williams's approach becomes more likely because she draws very
specific, carefully quantified economic consequences (for example, that
courts should treat all marital property as jointly owned) from a concept of
the caregiver's contribution that is not made subject to any kind of
quantification. Judges may be willing to accept that a woman who has
provided domestic services is entitled to some of her former husband's
income, but that she should be entitled to upwards of fifty percent for a
period often substantially exceeding the dependency of the couple's
children may be harder to grasp, particularly when the proposed approach
offers no comparative quantitative analysis of the couple's contributions.
As this last argument suggests, Williams's decision to leave non-
commodification norms in place may be less an advantage than a drawback.
This is true not simply because it forecloses precise quantification of the
caregiver's contribution, but also because it leaves a central support for
domesticity intact. Williams treats "commodification anxiety" as a
distinguishing feature of the current normative environment, one that
feminists would do well to respect. Yet in important ways she understates
its integral link to domesticity. Characterizing women's family labor as
love has fostered many of the norms, practices, and expectations that have
kept domesticity firmly in place. Most obviously, it has made men
unwilling to credit women with having performed labor capable of creating
economic entitlements. This not only affects divorce settlements-women's
claims are addressed through the more discretionary regime of family law
rather than through the more determinate entitlements of property "'-but it
also influences relationships within the family. Men regard themselves as
the primary providers of the material well-being of the family. They expect
accommodation of their professional needs, such as overtime work and
professional entertainment, and deference to their choices, such as where to
work. Because men cannot conceive of their spouses' familial contribution
in economic terms, they may understate both their spouses' contribution to
their families' economic well-being and the demands that their own "ideal-
worker" patterns impose on their wives. Caregiving women, however, also
become more firmly yoked to domesticity through the lessons of non-
commodification. Not only do they fail to recognize their contribution to
the economic well-being of their families; they may also come to embrace
the loving self-abnegation that non-commodification specifies as their lot.
A woman influenced by these assumptions may readily assimilate her own
84. Williams observes this difference in the legal realms in id. at 120.
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interests to her husband's material or professional well-being.8 She may
never question whether she is being adequately compensated or valued for
her labors until her husband leaves her and she is left with nothing, or until
he divorces her and she is forced to sell the family home.
Williams seeks to compensate women's domestic contribution in
market terms, thereby mitigating the worst harms of domesticity. Yet she
proposes to do so without confronting dominant conceptions that classify
family work as a distinctly non-market phenomenon." Without more
strenuous disruption of the "commodification anxiety" that prevents us
from seeing family work as a value-creating enterprise, it is not clear that
courts or family members will actually alter the way they think about
familial labor. Williams's effort to describe family work as support of the
market worker' does not give women's caregiving labor its own
independent status. It is compensable only upon divorce, and even then it is
characterized as dependent or derivative, something that is of value because
it assists the market worker. Men, be they husbands or legal actors, may
believe that the post-divorce property allocation that follows from this view
is simply "compassionate domesticity": a dressed-up claim by which
women obtain what they "need." Women, for their part, may continue to
view their contribution to the family in a derivative way. Because the joint-
property approach links the economic valuation of the woman's work with
the support it provides to her "ideal-worker" husband, she may continue to
see her role as supporting her husband's (market) work and her economic
entitlements as deriving from this. All of these assumptions might be better
contested were Williams to characterize women's labor as straightforwardly
compensable or worthy of the other forms of support-from retirement
benefits to spousal accommodation-that men conventionally receive for
their work.
The benefits of connecting women's family labor with the conventional
indicia of work have been recognized by other feminist contributors to the
"work/family" literature. Martha Ertman advocates the use of commercial
85. In an essay addressing the same themes as Chapter 4 of Unbending Gender. Williams
describes an interview with the wife of a high-level executive. Asked what might have happened
had she objected to his "[near-]constant travel, she responded without hesitation, 'He probably
wouldn't be chairman of the board today."' Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for
Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 25. on file with The
Yale Law Journal). This response startled me because I had already formulated my own answer If
she had objected to his travel (as she might well have done, given its frequency), he probably
would have divorced her. I found it fascinating that I was assessing this "work/family" tension in
terms of her interests, when she was thinking only of his.
86. She explains that, by characterizing women's family labor as work that is performed in
support of a market employee, she can draw on " widespread notions of marital sharing within the
context of the dominant family ecology" without invoking "off-putting language that seems to
commodify intimate relations." WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 136.
87. See id. at 115-16 ("[Mhe husband can perform as an ideal worker only because he is
supported ... by a flow of family work from his wife.").
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metaphors to determine the allocation of property upon divorce.88 Katharine
Silbaugh urges the commodification and compensation of women's familial
labor.89 Martha Fineman eschews the market mechanism for a state-based
system of support for caregiving. ° None of these theorists offers an easy
answer. Commodifying women's labor comes with a variety of risks, from
exploitation by opportunistic middlemen 9' to the painfully low market
valuation assigned to the various categories of work that constitute family
labor.9" Proponents of governmental solutions must persuade the public that
we need more government support for families at a time when the current
legislative priorities suggest a desire for less.93 These proposals will entail a
host of difficulties in implementation specifically because they require
explicit confrontation of deeply embedded assumptions. However, they
reflect a crucial insight that Williams's analysis omits. They recognize that,
in a normative context that dichotomizes labor and love and places
women's family work in the latter category, there may be no room for
accommodating hybrid characterizations. Familial labor may continue to be
viewed as love unless it is explicitly associated with the forms of support
and compensation that help us recognize it as work.94
88. See Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's
Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998).
89. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law. 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1 (1996).
90. See FINEMAN, supra note 7, at 231.
91. Andrea Dworkin has offered a critique of this sort in relation to proposals to legalize
surrogacy, which are in essence proposals to commodify women's reproductive labor. See
ANDREA DWORKIN, The Coming Gynocide, in RIGHT-WING WOMEN 147, 174-88 (1983).
Similarly, Noah Zatz has discussed this problem in relation to the legalization of prostitution.
which might be regarded as the commodification of women's sexual labor. See Noah Zatz, Sex
Work/Sex Act: Law, Labor, and Desire in Constructions of Prostitution. 22 SIGNS 277. 289-90
(1997).
92. Williams has made this point in other contexts, and it is a valid one. See Williams, supra
note 85 (manuscript at 4) (describing the "market replacement approach" to valuing women's
contributions). However, one recent study valued the domestic labor of an "executive wife" at
$189,000 per year by valuing, on a pro rata basis, all the tasks that make up her daily work. See
Williams C. Symonds et al., Divorce Executive Style, BUS. WK., Aug. 3. 1998, at 56, 58 (citing an
update of a study contained in MICHAEL H. MINTON & JEAN LIBMAN BLOCK, WHAT IS A WIFE
WORTH? THE LEADING EXPERT PLACES A HIGH DOLLAR VALUE ON HOMEMAKING (1983)).
While this study focuses particularly on the work of a wife who also shoulders entertainment and
other social obligations in support of her spouse's career, it could well have implications for the
valuation of the contribution of other at-home spouses, because their labor in areas outside
entertainment would not seem to differ greatly from the work of the "executive wife."
93. A prime example of the contraction in government support for families is the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105. This Act repealed Aid for Families with Dependent Children and the Basic
Skills and Emergency Assistance programs and replaced them with Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families, a time-limited program in which assistance is tied to participation in work
activities. PRWORA also affected eligibility for food stamps, Medicaid, and other benefits
programs.
94. For a more extended treatment of this argument, see Kathryn Abrams, Destabilizing
Domesticity, 32 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 6-8. on file with The Yale Law
Journal).
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B. The "Discursive" Agenda
It is not difficult to imagine a kind of "discursive" 95 agenda that would
serve as a complement to Williams's legal proposals. As I argue above,
each of these proposals has the paradoxical feature that, while it may not be
systematically challenging enough to incite broad-based transformation, it
requires enough legal, institutional, and normative change to discomfit
decisionmakers. One could envision a "discursive" agenda that was
committed to initiating, through broad-based political action, the changes in
understandings and expectations that would support Williams's legal
initiatives. One could imagine a political campaign to highlight the integral
contributions of part-time or flextime workers, or a comparable effort
aimed at destabilizing the strong bifurcation between labor and love. One
might also imagine an effort to affect discourse that went beyond the scope
of the legal changes Williams proposes to target the even more deeply
embedded assumptions that these proposals leave unscathed: the norms that
connect masculinity to the role of provider or that make us reluctant to
commodify women's familial labor. This sort of "discursive" agenda might
make legal decisionmakers more receptive to Williams's specific proposals
and prepare the ground for broader legal and institutional change.
But the reader encounters no such agenda in Part II of Unbending
Gender. Committed as Williams is to proposing workable change that can
be implemented in the context of existing normative frameworks, she
targets neither the bedrock assumptions underlying domesticity nor the
more readily accessible norms that will make implementation of her legal
program difficult. Instead, her targets are the conceptual and strategic errors
that have been made in the most prominent debates over market and family
work. This agenda reflects a kind of pragmatism that contrasts with that of
Part I. Williams's search for the workable solution in this section leads her
to take not simply foundational norms, but also the terms of prominent past
debates, as an explicit point of departure.
In this section as well, the range and multiplicity of Williams's
proposals are impressive. She advocates relational changes such as
abandoning the prevalent tone of anger toward men" and framing
arguments in terms that reflect humor and empathy.97 She advocates other
changes that combine the relational and the substantive. For example,
95. 1 am using the word "discursive" in two senses here. First and foremost. I mean an
agenda that is organized around (gender) talk or "discourse." as opposed to the first part of
Williams's agenda, which centered on proposed legal changes. But I also use the term more
broadly to invoke the assumption of discursive formation-the notion that we are shaped not only
by laws or institutions, but also by social, cultural, and linguistic norms and practices.
96. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2. at 170.
97. See, e.g., id. at 247. Many of Williams's chapters begin with political cartoons designed
to convey this lighter and more inclusive form of political discourse.
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she suggests that feminists will be less likely to alienate women of
color and working-class women if they adopt a "tone of respect" toward
full-time caregiving.9' Still other proposed changes are substantive,
such as Williams's recommendations for reconceptualizing "choice" '
or reformulating the debates between "equal treatment" and "special
treatment" advocates."°°
The first three chapters of Part II critique the manner in which such
debates have occurred in the past and offer ways of reconceptualizing
often painful differences of opinion. Chapter 5 explores the "full-
commodification" approach that has alienated working-class women and
women of color by assuming that women find market work more
challenging and desirable than caring for children in the home... and by
failing to recognize the embattled masculinity of many men in these
communities. 0 2 Chapters 6 and 7 return to the most familiar feminist
conflict framing discussions of work and family: the debate over sameness
and difference, "equal treatment" and "special treatment." She seeks to
reconceptualize these debates, not as struggles over women's essence or
over work/family advocates' central goals, but as differences in how
women respond to conventional gender roles 3 and how they seek to
achieve the goal of family accommodation that most of them share.""
Having reframed these differences, Williams concludes that it is not
necessary to resolve them in any definitive way, because these divergent
strategies are best seen as compatible resources from which feminist
advocates can draw. Deciding which strategy to press depends on which of
the "three axes" of "work/family" change one is trying to effect: a
reallocation of labor between partners within a family, between the
employer and the employee in the workplace, or between the public and the
private sphere more generally.0 5
The final chapter revisits the central themes of the book in a more
theoretical vein. Williams elaborates on her earlier position that domesticity
is a "force field" that powerfully conditions, but does not thoroughly
dictate, the choices made by women and men about work, parenting, and
98. Id. at 174.
99. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
100. See id. at 241-42.
101. See id. at 151-53.
102. See id. at 157-60.
103. The central disagreement, Williams argues, is not between those who view women as
similar to men and those who view them as different, but between "tomboys," who seek to
distance themselves from traditional gender roles, and "femmes." who seek to enjoy and validate
traditional femininity. See id. at 183-98.
104. "Equal-parenting advocates" believe this accommodation should be undertaken in a
gender-neutral way that encourages transformation in traditional, gendered parenting roles. See id.
at 226-28. "Maternalists" argue that care is given predominantly by women and that employers'
(or other) programs should more specifically target those who are actually doing the work. See id.
105. See id. at 232-41.
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other attributes of gender roles. °6 People can and do engage in "gender
negotiation," an ongoing process of responding to, resisting, and attempting
to reshape the gender roles created by domesticity or other forces of gender
formation."° One form of "gender negotiation" is the strategy of "drag":
the reproduction of specific attributes of gender, modified in such a way as
to cast problematizing light on the original. "o
In this chapter, Williams also considers whether a theory such as hers,
which is committed to acknowledging a range of truths regarding gender,
family, and work, leads inevitably to some form of moral relativism."0 9 Her
answer-that it does not-is delivered in two parts. First, she reformulates
"truth" as an expression of the central values, or the "identity," of the
person who speaks it."0 Second, she argues that this position does not give
rise to a moral system in which "anything goes." From a position that
embodies identifiable premises, such as the "reconstructive feminism" that
Williams introduces in this book, it is possible to explain how to "draw the
line"-that is, to identify the stances or practices one simply cannot
endorse, given one's assumptions."' Williams illustrates this point by
elaborating her view of two controversial gender-related practices: female
genital cutting and the wearing of the veil.'
2
Perhaps the greatest strength of this section is the way that it updates
longstanding debates in light of recent theoretical developments.
Dominance theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon did not, as Williams
suggests, simply "change the subject" from the tension between market
and family work to the eroticization of dominance."i' They introduced a
new way of thinking about gender as the product of social construction.
Though Williams does not ascribe this insight to dominance feminists, she
uses it expertly to reframe important debates. Thus, the dispute between
"sameness" and "difference" feminists becomes a debate between those
who resist and those who embrace traditional gender roles. And the struggle
between "equal treatment" and "special treatment" advocates becomes a
difference of opinion between those who seek to reward feminine gender
performances and those who seek to produce change in gender roles.
Translating a historic debate into contemporary terms, however, is
different from resolving it. It is less apparent to me that Williams's
reformulations will necessarily reduce the distance between contending
parties or advance popular discussions of market and family work. People
106. See id at 244-47.
107. See id. at 257-60.
108. See id at 259-60.
109. See id. at 260-63.
110. Seeid. at 261-62.
111. Id at263.
112. Seeid. at 263-70.
113. Id at 180.
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who disagree about how to respond to dominant gender formations still
disagree about something fundamental, particularly if the social formation
of human subjects is a widely accepted premise. It seems inaccurate to
suggest that disagreement about dominant social formations is any less
strenuous or enduring than disagreement about male or female essence.
Moreover, Williams's extended analysis of the special treatment/equal
treatment debate focuses our attention on historical divisions at the expense
of divisions that possess greater salience in contemporary discussions. I
suspect that the greatest tensions in this field today are not between mothers
who do market work and mothers who work exclusively in the home, or
between advocates of gender-specific and gender-neutral approaches to
familial accommodation." 4 They are, rather, between those who see an
urgent need to alter the structure of market and family work and those who
do not. The latter are a substantial group within the ranks of feminists.
While they offer some arguments that are not specifically feminist in
orientation (for example, that advocates such as Williams require
employers, or citizens via the state, to subsidize the choices of some people
to reproduce but not the equally valid choices of others), they offer others
that sound specifically in feminist analysis (for example, the point that
supporting familial work helps perpetuate the hetero-patriarchal norm of the
nuclear family by appearing to take it as a given)." 5 This division could
pose a real challenge to feminist efforts to mobilize around the question of
market and family labor, yet Williams does not acknowledge this
possibility."
6
114. Williams herself has opined that the central emerging dichotomy may be between
proponents of two of her three new axes of reform: those who favor redefining the relationship
between employees and employers in the market, and those who favor shifting responsibilities for
supporting parenting from the private to the public sphere. See E-mail from Joan Williams (Aug.
16, 1999) (on file with The Yale Law Journal). While I understand that the norms and priorities of
these two groups may differ, I am not convinced that this is an inevitable or particularly fractious
divide. Some feminist theorists, such as Martha Fineman and Williams herself, draw expedients
from both categories. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 232-41, Martha Albertson Fineman,
Contract, Marriage and Background Rules, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL
THEORY 183 (Brian Bix ed., 1998). Williams, too, claims that this division, while potentially
worrisome, is not inevitable. See E-mail from Joan Williams, supra.
115. It is not easy to find any of these arguments in print. Indeed, given the liberatory. anti-
subordinate impulse that fuels feminist commitment to work/family conflict and the more
conventional, pronatalist impulse that infuses dominant discussions of family in this society, it can
be difficult to raise such arguments at all. At the Hegemonic and Resistant Genderings Conference
(June 1999), organized by Williams and her colleague Adrienne Davis, one participant who
advanced these sorts of arguments described herself, only partly in jest, as functioning as "the
turd in the punchbowl." Yet such arguments are increasin'gly being raised in feminist discussions
of restructuring market work and family work. This issue was explored in an "Uncomfortable
Conversation" Conference, entitled "Children: Public Good or Private Responsibility?,"
sponsored by Martha Fineman's Feminism and Legal Theory Project Workshop at Cornell Law
School on November 19-20, 1999.
116. Moreover, Williams's framing of the "work/family" challenges in Unbending Gender
does little to vitiate the force of this division. For example, an emphasis on the range of caregiving
roles might strengthen interest in their accommodation, even among those who do not choose to
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Ultimately, I am unconvinced that even a focus on contemporary
divisions among feminists would be the most fruitful tack for Williams to
take. Williams's analysis suggests that divisions among feminists, women,
and men have effectively sidelined the struggle to restructure market and
family work and that healing these divisions is essential to setting a broad-
based movement in motion again. This suggestion places an almost
substantive emphasis on the largely formal virtues of peaceful coexistence.
Divisions among feminists (and others) may have been a distraction in the
first period of struggle over this topic; they may have fractured potential
coalitions and reduced the number of activists pressing for particular
change. But they are less a central cause of the problem of domesticity than
a symptom of the larger normative framework that has produced it.
One of the most powerful effects of a gender system is its ability to
naturalize the particular way it tends to frame issues or debates. Catharine
MacKinnon has made this point about liberal legalism: It frames questions
of equality as questions of sameness and difference." 7 Because its hold on
the public mind is strong, this approach is viewed not simply as one way of
framing questions of equality, but as the only way of conceiving of those
questions. This frame exaggerates the differences between two conceptually
related views and makes these differences appear to be the only matters
worth worrying about. Something similar has occurred in connection with
domesticity, where the failure to question norms such as productivity,
have children. Martha Fineman defines "dependency work" as care for the elderly, the ill. and the
disabled, as well as for children; this definition comprehends circumstances that adults are likely
to experience and that involve no choice whatsoever. See Martha Albertson Fineman. Cracking
the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency 49 At. U. L REV.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 7, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Moreover, Fineman's
redefinition of the family as a caregiving, rather than a sexual, unit makes the family and its
accommodation a vehicle for change rather than an instrument for reinforcing the norms of
hetero-patriarchy (that is, a gender system that privileges maleness, masculinity, and
heterosexuality in intertwined ways). See FINEiAN, supra note 7. at 227-33. Williams endorses a
broader conception of caregiving and supports the pluralization of the family form. I have heard
her take both positions explicitly in public appearances. Joan Williams, Address at the Gallivan
Conference (Apr. 9, 1999); Joan Williams, Commentary at the Hegemonic and Resistant
Genderings Conference (June 1999). Neither of these potentially ameliorating positions, however,
is clear from the framing of her argument in this book_ Virtually all of her examples concern the
accommodation of childcare responsibilities within a nuclear family, most frequently a family that
began with two heterosexual parents. And though Williams is generally conscientious about the
exploration of differences in this work, she disavows responsibility for discussing caregiving in
gay relationships and for normalizing nuclear family life through a virtually exclusive focus on it,
by means of a series of brief "provisos" in the introduction. See WILLIANMS supra note 2. at 8-9.
Finally, Williams's decision to support a second species of "ideal worker"e-the family-centered
employee who works part-time--rather than to challenge the single-minded, conventional model
may make obtaining support and accommodation more difficult for employees whose external
commitments do not nm to family. A workplace freed from the current, impregnable commitment
to maximizing production or profits would be a more receptive home to employees with a range
of external interests and commitments.
117. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 34 (1987).
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masculinity, and the patterns of the "ideal worker" has not only foreclosed
many solutions, but has framed views with many common assumptions
(such as "equal treatment" and "special treatment" approaches to familial
accommodation) as polar opposites. However, if our goal as feminists is to
challenge the hegemony--or even the validity-of the system in question,
we should not focus on rearranging the terms of the debates it has produced.
We should launch a frontal assault on the conceptual framework that
produces them."8 Or, as a first step, we should shift the public gaze toward
wholly distinct ways of conceptualizing the problem in question. Thus,
MacKinnon, for example, describes questions of equality as questions of
dominance and subordination. Williams does not neglect this point entirely.
Her effort at the end of Chapter 7 to shift the debate from "special
treatment" and "equal-treatment" (or from her preferred terms,
"maternalists" and "equal-parenting advocates") to a focus on the " three
possible axes" of change is a move in the right direction." 9 However, this
nine-page discussion, coming at the end of an almost sixty-page refraining
of sameness and difference, seems almost an afterthought. Williams's
failure to elaborate on these axes in any other part of the text, or to justify
what appears to be a marked preference for the axis of revising roles and
responsibilities between employers and employees, makes readers wonder
how prominently this reconceptualization figures in her vision of reform.' 0
III. GENDER-BENDING AND GENRE-BENDING: PRAGMATISM AND
POPULISM REVISITED
The analogy to MacKinnon's work on dominance is, in other respects,
inapt. Williams explicitly rejects the kind of frontal assault on a dominant
framework that MacKinnon undertakes. Her book proposes not a theoretical
attack on the conceptual foundations of domesticity so much as a grassroots
effort to subvert the system, by pitting certain of that system's elements
against itself. In this Part, I assess two features of Williams's method (or
perhaps, one might say, her meta-strategy): her subversive strategy of
118. See id. at 40-45.
119. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 232-41.
120. It does not help this section that it is presented as a survey in which Williams canvasses
the pros and cons of each approach without expressing preferences among them or even detailing
the kinds of contexts in which each would be most likely to be effective. (This seems particularly
odd given that her legal proposals suggest a preference for the third axis: redefining the
relationship between employers and employees.) In addition, this section is peppered with
examples of how each strategy has been attempted in a number of different nations or cultures.
Although this approach demonstrates the breadth of Williams's learning on this subject and avoids
the cultural solipsism present in much American feminist work, it is also confusing. These varied
contexts are presented, as it were, out of context. The reader does not learn enough about these
settings to understand what the strategies' success or failure means for their use in the United
States.
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"domesticity in drag" and her effort to engage and mobilize a popular
audience.
A. Is Gender Bending? Assessing "Domesticity, in Drag"
"Domesticity in drag" is presented as the ultimate expression of
Williams's pragmatism. 2' This strategy permits her to work with the
elements of the existing normative framework but to problematize or alter
them in ways that are intended to produce change. It is thematically related
to her strategy of pluralizing gender performances and institutional
arrangements rather than launching a frontal assault on dominant
arrangements and imagery. But "drag," as an emerging literature tells us, is
a precarious and risky undertaking. ' A "man in a skirt,"'" to take
Williams's initial example, may be provocative and disturbing; or he may
simply look silly. A woman in a tuxedo or a suit may raise questions about
the fixity of gender roles or the ambivalent character of heterosexual desire;
or she may, like the legions of women who trudged off to work in ill-fitting
blue suits, simply look like a woman who is trying to look like a man.
Much depends on who is watching the performance and how it is conceived
and executed. Both of these factors raise questions about Williams's case.
Williams's deployment of "drag" may be counterproductive with
respect to at least part of her prospective audience. The choice of an avant-
garde sexual metaphor 24 to cap an argument directed at a popular audience
is an unusual one, to say the least. "Drag" as a concept has tended to
engage those who practice it, academics who study it, and (mostly young)
people who are exploring their sexual identities.2 When Williams says,
"Picture a man in a skirt," 126 1 do not see the newly divorced caregiver, the
overextended working mother, or the disillusioned blue-collar father
leaning forward with curiosity and enthusiasm. And the possible mismatch
between message and audience has the potential to affect not only interest
121. See, e.g., WILLAMS, supra note 2, at 198. 260.
122. For a thoughtful discussion of the advantages and dangers of deploying some elements
of the dominant normative system to expose or undermine others, see Susan Eta Keller, Viewving
and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEO. L.J. 2195, 223942 (1993).
123. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 245.
124. Among the prominent theorists whom Williams cites in developing and supporting her
strategy are Pierre Bourdieu and Judith Butler. See id. at 38 & 285 nn.101-02 (citing PIRR
BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 26. 56, 58 (1980)); id. at 322 nn.49 & 59 (citing JUDrTH
BUTLER, BODIEs THAT MATER 231 (1993): BuTLER. supra note 13). In the following
discussion, I will rely primarily on Butler's theory of -drag" as a political strategy, using her
book Gender Trouble.
125. For an interesting popular exchange over whether "drag" has been broadly embraced as
a social or cultural norm or strategy, see Jesse McKinley, Reinventing Hedi'ig froin Wig on
Down; Ally Sheedy in a Man's World, the Gender-Bending Role of Drag Queen, N.Y. TIES.
Sept. 16, 1999, at El.
126. WLLIAMS, supra note 2, at 245.
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but understanding. Williams's prescribed performances, unlike some other
forms of "drag," will inevitably operate in many social settings in which
reading these performances as simply peculiar, or as reproducing the
existing gender arrangements, is easier or more "natural" than reading
them as subversive. As Susan Bordo has argued in a critique of Judith
Butler's deployment of "drag," "[S]ubversion is contextual, historical, and
above all social. No matter how exciting the 'destabilizing' potential of
texts, bodily or otherwise, whether those texts are subversive or
recuperative or both cannot be determined in abstraction from actual social
practice." "17 Butler herself, notwithstanding the breadth of her endorsement
of a politics of "drag" or "subversive repetition," 12' admits that the
question of which repetitions become "disruptive" and which become
"domesticated" depends on "a context and reception in which subversive
confusions can be fostered." 129 Williams does not explore the
"recuperative" (or system-reinforcing) potential of "domesticity in drag,"
nor does she identify contexts in which it is likely to pose a danger. In
failing to provide this contextualization, she runs the risk that insisting on
the norm of parental care, for example, will result not in disrupting but in
reinforcing a regime in which the parent who provides the care is the
mother.
But the difficulties with "domesticity in drag" go beyond matters of
audience and interpretation, to the presentation and conception of the
strategy itself. Williams does not always seem comfortable in employing
her preferred strategy. Although she frequently invokes the label
"domesticity in drag" as a means of highlighting a conceptual unity in her
proposals, there are comparatively few occasions on which she actually
deploys a(n altered) norm of domesticity to challenge domesticity's hold.
Using the norm of parental care to challenge the norm of the "ideal
worker" is the most prominent example;' 3° she also invokes responsible
parenthood to justify abortion' 3' and, more indirectly, uses anti-
commodification sentiment to justify the choice of the joint-property
approach.132 Yet a handful of examples in a book of this length does not
seem to warrant the central billing this strategy receives. More importantly,
with some of these examples, it is not clear whether Williams is turning the
norm to subversive purposes or acquiescing in a dominant view of it: Her
criticism of the "unhealthy" commodification implicit in human-capital
127. Susan Bordo, Postmodern Subjects, Postmodern Bodies, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 159, 172
(1992) (reviewing, inter alia, BUTLER, supra note 13).
128. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 185.
129. Id. at 177.
130. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 200.
131. See id. at 202.
132. See, e.g., id. at 134-36.
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approaches to the division of marital property is an unsettling example.'33
Finally, few of these examples entail the "serious play" of a "drag"
performance."M Far from being open-ended and multilayered, the
invocation of dominant norms is generally assigned a very specific
meaning. And rather than being playful, their deployment frequently has the
earnestness and sobriety of an immanent critique.
Yet my main concern is not that Williams's deployment of "drag" is
less skillful or even less appropriately targeted than it might be. My concern
is that it is less searching than the term or its most prominent theorization
implies-and less strenuous than displacing the system of domesticity
requires. Gender-bending is urgently required to elude the bonds of the
current system, but it is gender-bending of a more vigorous sort. Revising
the structure of market and family work demands that we reveal
masculinity as a contingent, re-configurable construct that can be connected
with the provision of care as well as with the provision of material support.
It requires that we expose the role of "mother" as a cultural construct that
can be re-articulated with productive labor, rather than exclusively with
love. These reconfigurations of conventional roles are a serious challenge;
they trouble our most deeply held assumptions about what it means to be a
man or woman in this society. They might be facilitated by a feature that is
central and explicit in Butler's theorization of "drag," but that is
evanescent and only fleetingly captured by Williams's. That is the goal of
"destabiliz[ing] and render[ing] in their phantasmic dimension": a male
and female, masculine and feminine, or "confounding the very binarism of
sex, and exposing its fundamental unnaturalness." '" This goal is not absent
from Williams's account. She persistently seeks to de-naturalize gender, to
describe it as a social construct that can be performed, bent, or otherwise
modified. But she does not describe gender as "phantasmic," an effect of
social discipline "inscribed on the surface of bodies" "' rather than the
expression of an interior psychic order. Abandoning the notion of gender as
an expression of interiority---complex and socially mediated, but interiority
nonetheless-would require a rupture with Williams's Deweyian premises:
The notion of the human subject as at least a partial cause, rather than an
effect, of social processes is at least as firmly entrenched as, for example,
"commodification anxiety." The move from a theory of interiority to a
Butlerian theory of "signification" or performance would certainly risk
133. Id. at 135.
134. See id. at 198 (" Suppleness and a sense of open-ended play are important weapons if the
goal is domesticity in drag.").
135. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 147.
136. Id. at 149.
137. Id. at 136.
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confusing or alienating Williams's more general audience.' Thus
Williams's pragmatism seems ultimately to be in tension with the demands
of a genuinely destabilizing version of "drag," one which might serve as
the prelude to a stark reconfiguration of masculinity, femininity, or
"mothering."
I am not convinced that a radical strategy of "drag" is the only, or even
the best, route to the disruption or displacement of the gender norms that
comprise "domesticity." The proliferation of gender norms associated with
this strategy'39 may be most useful when the goal is to destabilize a binary
arrangement held in place by an assumption of naturalism. The pluralism of
gender norms that tends to be produced by "drag" presentations that
distinguish between "sex and performance, .. . sex and gender, and gender
and performance" 140 may help, in a conceptual way, to trouble the
naturalized dichotomies between male and female, masculine and feminine.
But this destabilizing of a conceptual frame is different from achieving
palpable change in institutional settings. Domesticity incorporates sex and
gender binaries, but it also associates them with patterns of work and care,
and institutionalizes them in professional and legal structures and cultural
expectations. It is not clear that pluralizing gender norms, or even
pluralizing norms of performance in the workplace (as Williams seeks to do
with her legal protection of part-time and flextime work), can disrupt these
entrenched institutional and cultural arrangements.
One version of this point has been made by Susan Bordo in discussing
the postmodern tendency to "celebrate 'resistance' . .. and the instabilities
of systems rather than their recuperative tendencies":
[E]ven as we rightfully insist on recognition of the creative
responses that are open within even the most oppressive regimes,
we [should] neither overromanticize the degree of actual cultural
138. In her excellent review of Butler's Gender Trouble, Susan Bordo describes the book as
so difficult to read and understand that it is likely to "stir[] up 'trouble' only for a handful of
academic sophisticates." Bordo, supra note 127, at 173-74. One could imagine Butler's ideas
communicated in a more accessible fashion; however, the conceptual distance of the book from
conventional, liberal notions of agency and subjectivity would in any case make its central ideas
difficult for many segments of Williams's prospective audience to comprehend.
139. Williams does not simply proliferate gender norms. She applies this " drag" -related
strategy more broadly by striving to create a kind of democratic pluralism of work and family
arrangements. She counsels respect for a variety of decisions regarding market and family work,
presses the workplace to be receptive to part-time and flextime as well as "ideal workers." and
proposes three potential "axes" of change to be deployed in different contexts. There is much to
be said for this approach. It accepts the fact of women's diversity and respects the contingency
created by the various contexts in which women find themselves, and it allows for the postmodern
strategy of localized resistance and the "pragmatist" preference for pursuing what works in a
given situation. Yet, as I argue above, it is not clear that this strategy of pluralization is capable of
producing systematic or institutional change.
140. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 137.
141. Bordo, supra note 127, at 172.
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disruption and change that these responses represent or allow
emphasis on individual choice and creativity to obscure continued
patterns of systematic subordination. ... The "reproductive"
tendencies of [dominant ideologies] are very powerful; most
people, apparently, have no problem accommodating data which
should subvert their assumptions to fit their prevailing organization
of reality. 42
Joel Handler offers a slightly different version of this point: It is not
only individual "resistance" but also social movements organized around
postmodern theories that have failed to dislodge entrenched,
institutionalized norms.'43 Surveying a series of social movements that have
reflected aspects of the democratic pluralism of postmodern social theorists,
Handler concludes that they have failed to sustain coalitions or to produce
institutional change, in part because their commitment to contingency,
pluralism, and localism have disabled them from dealing with opponents
that are not similarly constrained.'" When it is not so much the naturalism
of the gender binary but its institutional manifestations that need to be
challenged, a more direct attack on dominant institutional norms, of the sort
that I described above, may achieve greater success. But whether the
answer to domesticity lies in a radical destabilization and denaturalization
of gender or in a systematic, substantive challenge to institutionalized
norms, it is unlikely to be found in "domesticity in drag." Williams's
solution may make domesticity less constraining. It may add, in Lorde's
coinage, a few rooms to "the master's house." But it cannot be expected to
bring the structure down.
B. Genre Wars, or the Uncertain Courtship of a PQpular Audience
Williams's most striking innovation may be her decision to direct a
challenging, intellectually rich book to a substantially non-academic
audience. It may be useful to reflect on how this form shapes her treatment
of her topic and on how a popular effort of this degree of intellectual
seriousness may influence norms and practices in the legal academy. My
assessment here is mixed. The complications of this approach are tangible,
particularly with respect to presentation. Moreover, the breadth of the
audience may conspire with the Deweyian emphasis on the "precious
142. Id. at 172-73.
143. See Joel F. Handler, Postmodenzism, Protest, and the New Social Movements. 26 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 697, 719-28 (1992).
144. See id. at 726 ("The postmodernists defend their position with the claim, 'But there are
no Grand Narratives.' However, the opposition is not playing that game. It has belief systems.
meta-narratives that allow theories of power. of action.").
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values embedded in our traditions" 145 to root the effort too firmly in the
normative status quo. However, the greater transformation produced by
Williams's effort may be found in another area: its challenge to the way
that feminist legal scholars seek to produce change. Williams challenges us
to engage with those non-specialists who will be affected by social and
legal change. Reaching out to people not as lawyers or claimants, but as
discussants or activists, acknowledges that feminist legal analysis has
pressed beyond the purely legal to address social structures or cultural
practices. The ensuing dialogue may also help us to reflect more fully on
the problems we propose to solve.
Writing a book that can speak simultaneously to academic and lay
audiences is no small task, and Williams heightens the challenge by
pluralizing the groups she seeks to reach within each segment of her
audience. Her academic targets include legal scholars interested in doctrine;
feminist students of second-wave disputes over work and family;
sociologists interested in gender norms, family life, and workplace
innovations; postmodernist social theorists; and scholars drawn to
pragmatic philosophical approaches. Her non-academic audiences include
groups that have been subject to work/family tensions, including
overextended working mothers, full-time caregivers impoverished by
divorce, and men struggling in various ways with the expectations and
disillusionments of being "ideal workers." Also among the intended non-
academic readers are courts, policymakers, and well-intentioned employers.
Addressing so broad a topic to so diverse a group is bound to entail
complications, and some of these are evident on the face of the effort.
Every reader must push through passages that were not written with her in
mind: Time-starved working parents may become impatient with a
discussion of Bourdieu's concept of "habitus," 146 and academic lovers of
the subtle or oblique introduction may balk at a preface entitled "What This
Book Is About." "' Sometimes even addressing the right material to the
right audience becomes a challenge. For example, much of Chapter 7,
which deals with core issues of "gender talk," is far more academic than
one might expect. It offers a more detailed account of a technical legal
academic debate than most educated laypersons, or even policymakers, are
likely to have a taste for.148 Conversely, Chapter 8's exploration of truth as
an expression of identity is so uncomplicated and accessible in its
exposition that it neglects some of the subtleties an academic might prefer
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 244 (quoting DEwEY, supra note 11, at 26 ("precious values
embedded in social traditions")).
146. See id. at 38.
147. Id. at ix.
148. See, e.g., id. at 218-31.
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in a controversial theory of truth.' 9 Indeed, those most concerned with the
implications of reconstructive feminism for a theory of truth are likely to be
philosophically oriented academics.
Finally, notwithstanding the energy and originality of its exposition, the
range of ideas and audiences risks argumentative overload. Williams has
the heart and the endurance of a long-distance runner; she is indefatigable
in reconstructing debates, chasing down the flawed assumptions in decades-
old arguments, and reporting mounds of empirical data. However, her
persistently energetic exposition sometimes exceeds the number of ideas
that a mortal can hold in mind at one time. But there is more than battle
fatigue at stake here. The sheer weight of her ?rguments, combined with her
primarily popular presentation, often obscures the theoretical structure of
Williams's central argument. Glimpsing the connection between
"commodification anxiety" and domesticity, or between Williams's
Deweyian pragmatism and her strategy of "domesticity in drag," requires
far more effort than it might in a more conventionally structured academic
work.
149. See, e.g., id. at 261-63. Williams states:
A closer examination of my truth about abortion shows that it does not reflect
timeless, universal principles. Instead, it reflects who I am. Like most women of my
class, I view an active sexual life as an entitlement and children in part in terms of
opportunity costs. From the time I was sexually active, I knew I had a lot to lose if I
had children at the wrong time. A pregnancy could deprive me of "my future," I would
have said in college....
Now consider a middle-aged Mormon mother of five who believes that her
purpose in life was defined by her marriage, that the purpose of marriage is procreation.
that sex outside of marriage is wicked, and that the wicked shall be punished. She is
unalterably opposed to abortion under any circumstances.
Am I in danger of being persuaded by the Mormon mother? No. This is merely to
say I like being who I am. And as long as my life retains the shape it has today, my
position on abortion will not change. My views reflect who I am. just as the opposing
truth of the Mormon mother reflects the shape and tenor of her life. Our truths are a
product of our social location and what we have chosen to make of it. ... Truths are
expressions of identity.
Id at 261. This surprisingly straightforward discussion of what Williams clearly knows to be one
of the thorniest questions in contemporary philosophy elides a range of questions that occur to an
academic reader on even a casual perusal of her discussion. Much of Villiams's discussion
focuses, for example, on the relation of truth to one's social location. What precisely does she
mean to add with the phrase "what we have chosen to make of if'? Does this refer to Williams's
decision to capitalize on her relatively privileged social circumstances by attending college and
fostering the expectation of a "future" (that presumably was not comprehended by childbirth)? Or
might it also mean the particular ways in which Williams has reflected on her social location.
which may be partly but not entirely determined by the features of that location? Does irrational.
or otherwise deeply flawed, reflection on one's social situation represent a "truth" ? How does one
account for such phenomena as weakness of the will (that is, visceral inability to do what one
believes to be the right thing) or strong, persistent ambivalence in a definition of" truth" rooted in
"identity"? My point is not that Williams is obliged to answer these questions in a book that is
clearly addressed primarily to other issues. My point is that it seems surprising for her to "pitch"
this discussion at a level best suited to the educated lay reader, when the question itself seems
most likely to be of interest to the more academic reader.
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The greatest difficulties with Williams's appeal to a popular audience,
however, are not formal but substantive. Though Williams is not explicit
about the relation between her pragmatism and her popular focus, there
appears to be a kind of synergy between them. She may address a lay
audience because she believes that "gender talk," which is not the
exclusive province of academics, is the key to solving the current impasse.
But she also sets her sights on the "values embedded in our traditions"
because those are the values of the people she cares about engaging.
Whatever the order, Williams's popular focus may be responsible for
yoking her program more firmly to the status quo. She is constrained, at
least to some degree, by the tone, imagery, and institutional structures that
she believes her lay audience will accept. Thus, we get the "man in a
skirt," instead of more radical forms of gender-bending. This constraint
exacerbates the tendency toward the normative status quo that is already
implicit in Williams's Deweyian pragmatism. And, in some respects, it may
also defeat her purpose. Unless we raise a more disruptive, systematic
challenge to the norms of gender, work, and love that construct the current
impasse, any grassroots mobilization may be unavailing.
However, there are many ways to draw upon the energies of a lay
audience, and deploying them as foot soldiers in a carefully orchestrated
campaign of change, which seems to appeal to Williams, 5 ' is only one of
them. Some of the most transformative books that have addressed this
topic, such as Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique" ' and Arlie
Hochschild's The Second Shift,152 have also been addressed to a general
public. But they have sought less to mobilize their readers than to raise their
consciousness and to engage them in a broad public debate about solutions.
Though portions of Williams's book have a more tactical sound, such a
consciousness-raising strategy seems to be part of her effort as well.
Through her compelling analysis of domesticity, she challenges readers to
see that the tensions between market work and family work go further than
the availability of family leave or the necessity of working overtime. They
implicate a range of values, beliefs, and argumentative positions that have
150. At least two features of Williams's argument lead me to suspect that she is interested in
broad-based political mobilization. The first is her fairly persistent effort to coin phrases that
might take hold of the popular imagination. See, e.g., id. at 4 ("reconstructive feminism"). 8
("domesticity in drag"), 38 (domesticity as a "force field"), 185 ("femmes" and "tomboys").
The second is her effort to make specific, tactical suggestions for arguing to others, such as the
use of humor or the avoidance of anti-male rhetoric. See. e.g., id. at 245 (humor), 271 (male
bashing).
151. BETTY FRiEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15-32 (1984 ed.) (identifying the "problem
that has no name": women's lack of fulfillment in being relegated exclusively to the role of wife
and caregiver).
152. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND Tilti REVOLuTION
AT HOME (1989) (describing the ways in which even working mothers perform a "second shift"
of labor in the home).
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become so familiar that we have ceased to recognize them as debatable
norms that can be changed. Creating this awareness can be crucial; like The
Feminine Mystique and The Second Shift, Unbending Gender could ignite a
new debate over what should happen next.
Williams's choice of audience offers a further lesson to legal
academics. A bold effort such as Williams's, one that reaches so far beyond
the usual terrain of legal scholarship, challenges us to see how little we
know about social change enacted outside the courtroom or the legislature.
Since the early debates over "work/family conflict," feminist legal scholars
have come to identify legal barriers to women's equality as part of larger,
more intricate social patterns and practices. Solving the problems of
women's oppression that we identify, therefore, has become a task of which
legal expedients form only one part. Yet, if legal feminists have begun to
learn from our counterparts in the humanities and social sciences how to
move our analysis of inequality beyond the analysis of legal institutions, we
have not gained a comparable understanding of how to envision or to
formulate extra-legal solutions. Most legal feminist work, including work
with a broad critical vantage point, culminates in highly particularized legal
proposals.'53 We have been unable, or unwilling, to translate our theoretical
perspectives into language that a non-academic audience can understand;
most of us know little about when the time is right to seek a broader
audience, what kinds of approaches engage popular attention, and other
crucial tactical questions. Williams recognizes this deficit and is committed
and courageous enough to do something about it. Her accessible style, her
emphasis on "gender talk," and her focus on relational political practices-
such as the use of humor or the respectful treatment of mothers who choose
not to do market work-are evidence of her commitment to engage this
new audience. By extending the legal academic conversation to
policymakers, activists, and men and women simply trying to live their
lives, Williams challenges us to enrich the process through which we
develop answers and to see our work in a less insular way.
153. I could pick any number of articles to support this point, but particularly illustrative is
one of my own. In Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory. 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 304 (1995), I criticize the failure of some feminist scholars to characterize adequately the
agency that women retain even under circumstances of oppression. and argue that these
characterizations have had consequences not only in legal doctrine, but in popular political
struggles as well. The solutions I propose, however, are either conceptual proposals aimed at
scholars or doctrinal proposals aimed at courts and advocates. See id. at 354-76. 1 do not direct
any proposals to the public, though I specifically argue they have been affected by feminist
theoretical characterizations.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Unbending Gender is a stunningly rich effort, full of new ideas and
methodological innovations. Its Deweyian pragmatism may be its greatest
weakness, curtailing its normative challenge and limiting feminists to the
uncertain strategy of turning dominant norms against themselves. But
Williams's provocative analysis of domesticity, and her challenge to
consider the role of a non-academic audience in legal academic work, are
crucial contributions that will continue to bear fruit, for this problem and
for others.
